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normal economy which henceforth would be the main driver of economic growth
and development for that country. The new normal economy would also imply a
shift in the economy’s structure towards services and its being driven by consumer
demand. There would be greater reliance on market competition and the removal of
the ‘privileges’ of state-owned enterprises. This paper argues that it is not enough
for the required legal framework to exist in statutes but that they should be observed
as law in action. Using a line of reasoning based on New Institutional Economics,
evidence drawn from the differing experiences of countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, in particular, in their transition towards a market economy and empirical
evidence analysing the effectiveness of adopting laws from one jurisdiction in
another this paper argues that the success of the new market economy policy will
depend not only on the reform of the law on the books but also on how it is
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1 Introduction
The authorities in China have enunciated the development of a new normal
economy which henceforth would be the main driver of economic growth and
development for that country. The expected rate of growth from this policy (c7%)
would be lower than those which have been achieved in recent years (10–12%) but
prior rates of growth were no longer sustainable. The new normal economy would
also imply a shift in the economy’s structure towards services and its being driven
by consumer demand. There would be greater reliance on market competition and
the removal of the ‘privileges’ of state-owned enterprises. It has been argued by
many including the present writer that market economies require a complex legal
foundation.1 The present paper argues that it is not enough for the required legal
framework to exist in statutes but that they should be observed as law in action.
Using a line of reasoning based on New Institutional Economics (NIE), evidence
drawn from the differing experiences of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, in
particular, in their transition towards a market economy and empirical evidence
analysing the effectiveness of adopting laws from one jurisdiction in another this
paper argues that the success of the new market economy policy will depend not
only on the reform of the law on the books but also how it is implemented through
the courts and how it fits with both Chinese legal tradition and culture.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section NIE is introduced and
Oliver Williamson’s model of levels of social analysis explained and the inter-
relationships between institutional environment and culture analysed; the subse-
quent section analyses the legal component of the institutional environment
necessary to support a market economy and how, inter alia, culture may constrain
the efficiency of the market; the third section examines evidence on the difficulties
faced by jurisdictions in the transition to a market economy through an examination
of the role which culture played in determining the differential progress made by
countries towards establishing a market-oriented economy during the transition
period in countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980 and 1990s, reporting
on statistical studies showing the importance of enforcement of laws on economic
growth across developing and developed countries and finally discussing the effect
of receptivity of legal transplants on the effectiveness of transplanted laws; the final
section of the paper summaries and draws out the policy implications of the
preceding analysis for the legal requirements of establishing a ‘new normal
economy’ in China.
2 New Institutional Economics
What has become known as NIE developed out of an implicit concern with what
underpinned the simple model of market exchange which is represented in
neoclassical economics. Ronald Coase in his seminal paper The nature of the firm2
1 Stephen 2016.
2 Coase 1961.
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posed the question of why firms exist, why resources are not all allocated by the
market. The existence of firms he attributed to transaction costs—the costs of using
the market. What Kenneth Arrow3 called the costs of running the economic system.
Oliver Williamson took up Coase’s idea in the 1970s to develop what he called
Transaction Cost Economics. Latterly Williamson has used the term ‘Governance’
to cover the issues dealt with by this type of analysis.
According to Menard and Shirley transaction costs together with property rights
and contracts are core concepts in the development of NIE.4 These three play a
crucial part in understanding the role of institutions in society. Below we use Oliver
Williamson’s levels of social analysis framework to illustrate how NIE can be used
to analyse economic development.5 The concept of transaction costs is then used to
understand difficulties which confronted policymakers who promoted the ‘big bang’
approach to the transition from an entirely state owned economy to a market
economy in Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE) after the fall of the Soviet system
in that region.
2.1 Transaction costs and contract
Transaction costs are defined by Dahlman6 as:
• Search and information costs (costs of finding someone with whom to contract).
• Negotiation and bargaining costs (costs of arriving at a contract with the other
party).
• Enforcement and policing costs (costs of ensuring that both parties deliver on
their side of the bargain, particularly where delivery is not instantaneous).
Before Coase neoclassical economics implicitly assumed that market transactions
are costless i.e. no resources are used up in the act of exchange. This, however, is
only the case in very special circumstances. Very many market transactions incur
search costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs moving contract to a central
position in the process of effecting market exchange. However these contracts are
neither costless nor necessarily complete. Contractual incompleteness is central to
Williamson’s work on Governance. Under what circumstances does incompleteness
occur? How do economic agents deal with it? One way is the creation of a firm:
transactional incompleteness explains why some transactions take place within
firms yet others take place between firms.
The size of transaction costs is influenced by a combination of human and
environmental characteristics (discussed below). The magnitude of transaction costs
affects governance structures. Before justifying this we examine the situation in
which they are likely to be low which comes closest to the neoclassical assumption
that market transactions are costless. Consider the purchase of a standardized good
3 Arrow 1961.
4 Menard and Shirley 2014.
5 Williamson 2000.
6 Dahlman 1979.
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for which there are many suppliers and potential consumers. Under such
circumstances search costs will be very low: both suppliers and consumers will
easily find someone with whom to contract. Because of standardization the
characteristics of the good, including quality, are easily ascertainable before
purchase. Bargaining costs are negligible because there is little to bargain over
(competition determines price). When exchange takes place instantaneously there
are no enforcement costs. Looking at these circumstances from a different
perspective the assumed market transaction of neoclassical economics is that of a
standardized good under conditions of perfect competition where exchange is
instantaneous: conceptually ‘perfect competition’ removes search costs; standard-
ization removes search and bargaining costs; instantaneous exchange removes
enforcement costs. Thus transaction costs are very small and in the limit are zero.
Absent standardised goods, transaction costs rise due to imperfect competition
and bargaining costs are incurred. If exchange is not instantaneous costs will be
incurred by both sides: the buyer to ensure that delivery takes place and what is
delivered has the characteristics implied by the bargain; or if payment is on delivery
the supplier will incur enforcement costs in ensuring payment takes place; and the
consumer incurs enforcement costs to ensure what is delivered is what was agreed.
When the transaction costs of using the market are sufficiently high the potential
buyer may prefer to produce the good itself because transaction costs outweigh any
cost advantage that specialised outside production has over self-production. If this
did not happen there would be no firms just markets composed of individuals. Inside
the firm the market mechanism is suppressed and replaced by managerial direction.
Coase (supra fn. 4) quotes D H Robertson as describing firms as ‘islands of
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter
coagulating in a pail of buttermilk’.7 Coase’s explanation is that these islands of
conscious power arise because they lower transaction costs.
Prior to the 1970s vertical integration had been seen as prima facie anti-
competitive by US anti-trust authorities until Oliver Williamson demonstrated that
vertical integration could be efficiency enhancing. This would be the case when the
production costs plus transaction costs were lower for a vertically integrated firm
than for two firms contracting on the market.8 Such circumstances would arise due
to a combination of particular human characteristics and transactional features
identified by Williamson9: the human characteristics of bounded rationality and
opportunism; and the transactional features of uncertainty/complexity and ‘the small
numbers condition’ (i.e. when there are few potential parties to the transaction).
What do we mean by bounded rationality? Herbert Simon argued that although
human behaviour is ‘intendedly rational’ it is ‘only limitedly so’. Neurophysiolog-
ical limits of the brain and language limitations set bounds on rationality. In many
situations economic actors cannot be as rational as neoclassical economics assumes
them to be. Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile which goes
7 Robertson 1928, at 85.
8 It should be stressed that it is the comparison of the sum of production costs and transaction costs that is
relevant here not just the comparison of transaction costs.
9 Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985.
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beyond the normal economic assumption of self-interested behaviour to include
strategic behaviour, threats, information withholding and exploitation of asymmet-
ric informational advantage.10 Whilst, not all economic agents behave opportunis-
tically, ex ante it will be difficult to tell which will. However, potential opportunism
is not, by itself, sufficient to raise transaction costs. It requires the presence of one or
both environmental or transactional conditions. The first of these is uncertainty or
complexity. If all possible outcomes are predictable and there are not too many, a
contingent claims contract could be written to cover all possible outcomes. However
if they are not, the bounds of rationality will be reached and the contract will be
incomplete. Thus the combination of bounded rationality and uncertainty/complex-
ity gives rise to higher transactions costs in the presence of opportunism.
Williamson describes the situation where bounded rationality, complexity/uncer-
tainty and opportunism combine as one of information impactedness.
Even so, information impactedness will not on its own be a problem. It requires
the presence of the small numbers condition for transaction costs to rise. If ex ante
there are a number of potential contractors they may compete by revealing
information to which the other party does not have access. In situations where the
transaction is not one-off but a recurring transaction the incentive to behave
opportunistically is also reduced. If a party behaves opportunistically on the first
occasion they are unlikely to be awarded the contract on a subsequent occasion
unless the initial award gives them a strategic advantage over their competitors.
Such an advantage has been termed ‘a first mover advantage’.
In other words, the combination of bounded rationality and complexity/uncertainty
when there is small numbers and potential opportunism means that a market
transaction is risky11 and ‘make’ rather than ‘buy’ is preferable. For Williamson the
key issue here is small numbers. When does this become crucial? It is when one or
more of the parties undertakes transaction specific investment i.e. an investment
which is worthless outside the transaction. Under such circumstances the party
undertaking the investment is open to opportunistic behaviour on the part of the other
party ex post. Thus the need to undertake transaction-specific or idiosyncratic
investment gives rise to circumstances where vertical integration is preferred to
contracting across a market interface. This gives rise to the view that firms and markets
are alternative governance structures by which to mediate transactions. If transactions
costs are sufficiently high the transaction will not take place across a market interface
but within a firm (or other organisational form): the firm will make rather than buy.
Thus transaction costs are seen as the major determinants of governance structures.
Another institutionalist was developing his ideas at the same time as Williamson.
Douglass North (together with Lance Davies) published Institutional Change and
American Economic Growth in 1971.12 Later, North further developed his analysis
10 Some authors, including the present writer in Stephen 1996, argue that the extension of self-interest
seeking to include guile is not necessary to achieve Williamson’s results. All that is required is that ‘…as
the relationship unfolds there will be opportunities for one party to take advantage of the others
vulnerability… to follow his own interests at the expense of the other party [and]… behave
opportunistically’, Goldberg 1984, at 129.
11 Victor Goldberg (op cit, at 128) uses the term transactional difficulties rather than transaction costs.
12 Davis and North 1971.
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of the importance of institutions for economic growth. Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz around the same time were working on the analysis of property rights.
These themes developed into what Williamson (1975, supra fn. 9) called New
Institutional Economics (NIE). Today NIE is seen to encompass: transaction cost
economics, economics of property rights, the positive theory of agency, relational
and incomplete contract theory; new institutional economic history; new institu-
tional political economy; constitutional economics and many more areas. Increas-
ingly, concern with the role of institutions has been incorporated into much of
mainstream economics by authors who would not necessarily consider themselves
to be a new institutional economist. It is of credit to the pioneers of NIE that what
was previously seen as being outside the mainstream has increasingly become
mainstream. Indeed, four of the leading writers in the NIE tradition (Ronald Coase,
Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson) have been recipients of the
Nobel Prize for Economics,
Figure 1 is adapted from Williamson (2000, supra fn. 9). The issue of designing
a legal system for the ‘New Normal Economy’ is part of the design of the
Institutional Environment. This sets the context within which economic agents can
design governance structures by which resources are allocated. The Institutional
Environment is taken to be exogenous to issues of governance as indicated by the
solid arrows in Fig. 1. In the longer run there may be feedback from the realm of
governance to the Institutional Environment leading to changes in the latter. This
may be the case where some aspects of the institutional environment cannot be
contracted around to fashion a ‘desirable’ governance structure in some aspect of
economic activity.
Williamson’s framework allows us to see the influence which institutions have on
economic behaviour. ‘Resource allocation’ is the concern of neoclassical eco-
nomics: economic agents react to the signals provided by product and factor markets
in allocating scarce resources to different activities. In Fig. 1 the solid arrow from
the level of Governance to resource allocation indicates that resource allocation is
constrained by existing ‘governance structures’. Resource allocation takes place on
a continuous basis but governance structures take longer to adjust (1–10 years,
according to Williamson). Over time governance structures may be adjusted in
response to inefficiencies through a feedback loop as indicated by the broken
vertical arrow in Fig. 1.
Governance structures are determined by transaction cost as argued earlier and
can consist of firms with different organizational and ownership structures,
bureaucracies, regulatory bodies, mutuals etc. Transaction cost economics analyses
these differing governance structures as arising to minimise transaction costs.
Changes in governance structures cannot be instantaneous but according to
Williamson (supra fn. 9) can take from a year to a decade to change. However, this
economising behaviour is itself constrained by the institutional environment within
which it takes place as indicated by the solid arrow from Institutional environment
level to the governance level in Fig. 1.
In Williamson’s model the institutional environment consists of formal rules:
constitutions; laws; property rights. As the solid arrow in Fig. 1 indicates changes at
this level are constrained by what Williamson refers to as Embeddedness which
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includes informal institutions, norms and religion. However, there may be feedback
from the governance level to the embeddedness level. Williamson13 refers to the
institutional environment as setting the ‘formal rules of the game’ and governance
as the ‘play of the game’. The embeddedness level might be seen as providing the
informal rules of the game. It is non-calculative and spontaneous where what is
often called ‘culture’ operates. Williamson refers to behaviour at this level as being
‘adopted’ and subject to inertia. A more general name for what Williamson (2000)
calls the embeddedness level is culture which is the term used below.
Although it is a relatively simple model, Williamson’s framework for social
analysis summarised in Fig. 1 highlights the limitations of neoclassical economics
as an analytical framework for understanding development policy. What Fig. 1
amply demonstrates is that the transition to a market economy would be heavily
constrained by governance structures, the institutional environment and culture. The
next section of this paper discusses the importance of the legal system component of
the institutional environment necessary for an effective transition to the new normal
economy in China.
3 The institutional environment
As discussed above, Williamson (2000) describes the institutional environment as
the ‘formal rules of the game’. These include the institutions of property, courts,








resource allocation through 
supply and demand
Fig. 1 Williamson’s ‘levels of
social analysis’ Adapted from
Williamson 2000
13 Williamson 2000.
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Williamson’s framework through the delimitation of property rights, the law and
court system and political structures and are subject to very infrequent adjustment
(Williamson suggests 10–100 years). However, the institutional environment is
itself constrained by culture. This paper and the conference on which it draws
focussed on the law and the court system to which we now turn.
3.1 The legal environment for the new normal economy
All market transactions take place under a set of rules which are either formal or
informal.14 The formal rules are embodied in laws (institutional environment) whilst
the informal rules come from social norms and conventions (culture). Both types of
rule may be seen as existing to reduce transaction costs (bargaining and enforcement
costs). Parties to a market transaction do not have to reinvent the law of contract or
social conventions every time they contract. They are bound by them either under
the law or by convention.15 They will expect them to be enforced. They may expend
resources (incur transactions costs) to mitigate contingencies which are not dealt
with by law or convention or are subject to less predictability of enforcement. To the
extent that existing laws and conventions in China do not provide an efficient and
effective means for securing transactions under the New Normal Economy’s
market-driven system higher transaction costs will be generated. Whilst some might
see such increased transaction costs as simply the costs of doing business others
would argue that they represent a diversion of potentially productive resources
(particularly human resources) into ‘non-productive activities’ and consequently
reduce economic growth. Could laws more appropriate to a market context reduce
these transaction costs? This leads to the suggestion that laws which have been
shown to be effective or even efficient in jurisdictions in which the market economy
is established should be incorporated into the Chinese legal system. However, the
analysis presented earlier in this paper should caution the reader against the
presumption that such legal transplanting is easily accomplished.
It was argued above that the institutional environment is constrained by culture
and that the institutional environment consists of more than the legal system. There
is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of legal transplants as well as on
whether there are legal rules which are best at supporting a market economy (see
further below). The next section of this chapter draws on empirical evidence from
these literatures to inform the discussion on the legal framework required for a
successful transition to the New Normal Economy in China.
A further dimension to this discussion is also provided by considering not only
the content of the law but also whether it is effectively enforced. This is pithily
expressed by the maxim that ‘It is the law in action that matters not the law in the
books’. A set of legal provisions contained in a statute may be judged to be
jurisprudentially perfect but have no effect if the jurisdiction’s courts either cannot
be relied on to enforce them or take decades to deal with disputes under these
statutes. The reform of courts or the judicial system may be just as important for
14 Or both.
15 Under common law they may be able to contract around contract law provisions.
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implementing a legal system to support the new normal economy as reforming the
content of specific laws. The next section of this chapter draws on evidence of the
importance of enforcement both relative to the content of laws but also what factors
seem to influence whether or not transplanted laws will be effectively enforced.
4 Evidence
In this section evidence of the importance of culture, enforcement and receptiveness
of transplants is drawn from the literature. First the importance of differences in
culture is used to explain the differences in the speed of the transition to a market
economy experienced in Central and Eastern Europe (henceforth C&EE) since the
1990s. Secondly, evidence of the importance of enforcement of laws by the courts
for economic growth across a range of countries is presented. Thirdly, the role
played by receptivity to legal transplants is illustrated by again considering the
transition towards a market economy in the countries of C&EE at the end of the
twentieth century.
4.1 Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: the importance of culture
The collapse of the Soviet system and the ensuing transition of the economies of
Central and Eastern Europe to market economies provide a rich source of evidence
on the importance of institutions in underpinning the market economic system.
Svetozar (Steve) Pejovich analyses of the role played by cultural differences on the
transition process across a range of Central and Eastern European jurisdictions.16 He
provides persuasive evidence on how a mismatch of culture and imported (imposed)
institutions can raise transaction costs diverting resources from productive activity
to activities to circumvent or undermine the transition process and inhibit economic
growth or to slow down the adoption of new institutions.
In Pejovich’s (2003) view the transition process was intended to ‘trans-
form…[C&EE countries]… into free market, private property economies’. This was
to be achieved through: privatization; macro-economic stability; and the liberal-
ization of prices and wages. He describes the transition as mixing the culture of
C&EE countries with the formal institutions of capitalism. The outcome of this
combination was an increase in transaction costs because:
• economic agents are not adapting to the new institutional environment and
consequently are spending more time and resources to undertake contracting
activity; or
• the newly established institutional environment is not properly functioning and
is costly to operate; or
16 Pejovich 2003, 2008. For a more general discussion of the failure of neoclassical economics to explain
the differential responses of countries to the transition process and the insights gained from New
Institutional Economics see Berglo¨f and Roland 2006.
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• the new institutional environment is incompatible with the prevailing culture
and as a consequence resources are being used up by trying to contract around
the new institutional structure; or
• there is cultural resistance to the changes in the institutional environment.
Pejovich focuses particularly on the last of these reasons to explain the differential
success of the transition process across the countries of C&EE.
When elements of the institutional environment are adopted/imposed/trans-
planted from another society there is the potential for a clash with existing practices
which may be deep-rooted or culturally-based. As Pejovich points out, although the
institutional environment may be a policy variable under the control of
policymakers culture is not. Informal rules or norms may impede the effective
implementation of formal rules (institutions).
Thus in some jurisdictions in C&EE there was sufficient unhappiness with the
new formal rules (or the true costs of using them) that economic agents sought to
evade them or disobey them or to resist their introduction. This led to higher
transaction costs of enforcing the formal rules or slowed the pace of reform. These
higher transaction costs drew resources away from productive activity and thus
reduced the growth which would be obtained from reallocating resource to higher
valued activities.
Pejovich attributes the lack of harmony between the formal rules adopted in
transition countries and the informal rules/norms in some C&EE countries to a clash
between the culture of these countries and the culture of capitalism. He sees the
transition process as replacing the institutions of socialism with those of capitalism
which he summarises as including: private property rights; freedom of contract; an
independent judiciary; a constitution. These, of course, are elements of the
institutional environment. Pejovich argues that transaction costs will be lower in a
society where these institutions are combined with a culture which emphasises
individualism through: self-interest seeking; self-determination; self responsibility;
risk taking; market competition. On the other hand, he sees the culture of C&EE
countries as predominately involving: collectivism; egalitarianism; extended family;
shared values. There is a cultural clash between this culture and the culture of
capitalism. More importantly these cultural values do not fit so readily with the
institutional environment of capitalism and result in increased transaction costs
because economic agents resist the new institutions or seek ways to circumvent
them.
Pejovich (2008) uses the Heritage Index of Freedom17 as a measure of the extent
to which a country’s institutional environment reflects the institutions of capitalism.
It is higher when a country’s institutions are further away from those of capitalism.
He uses historical influences of both religion and membership of former empires to
categorise C&EE countries into those whose cultures have been influenced
historically by Western culture and those influenced by Eastern culture. Western
culture is signalled by having been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and/or
17 The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom is published jointly by the Heritage
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.
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being predominately Catholic or Lutherin historically.18 Eastern culture is proxied
by having been part of the Ottoman or Russian Empires or predominately Orthodox
or Muslim.19 The Index of Freedom is higher for the countries which he classifies as
of eastern culture compared to those classified as of western culture both in 1996
and in 2006.20 For both groups the index falls between these dates but the gap
between the groups is maintained. Pejovich (2008) concludes from this evidence
that there was greater resistance to the introduction of the institutions of capitalism
in the eastern influenced countries but while it was being gradually overcome in
both groups of countries, the resistance was more prolonged in eastern influenced
countries.
This evidence from the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe is
consistent with the Williamson’s (2000, supra fn. 9) model. It demonstrates that
culture constrains the institutional environment. It should be noted that this does not
examine actual economic performance across transition countries but only the
introduction of what Pejovich calls the institutions of capitalism. Even where these
institutions have been introduced their impact may be affected by higher
transactions costs if (for cultural reasons) actors in the economy use resources to
contract around them.
4.2 Content versus enforcement of laws
Over the last twenty years or so a large literature has developed examining the
relationship between the content of laws, particularly, on corporate governance and
the economic performance of a jurisdiction which was stimulated by a series of
papers by the economists La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny21 in
which they argued, inter alia, that the Common Law jurisdictions provide better
protection for investors in companies than do Civil Law jurisdictions and that
enforcement was more effective in Common Law jurisdictions.22 Subsequent papers
challenged the empirical evidence adduced by these authors to support these claims
but others extended their conclusions by looking at the relationship between
corporate laws across jurisdictions and economic performance. This literature is
extensively reviewed in the present author’s forthcoming monograph (see fn. 1
above).
While these results remain controversial, both national governments and
multilateral development agencies (such as the World Bank) have undertaken
programmes of law reform stimulated by the view that the content of Anglo-
American investor protection and bankruptcy laws are efficiency enhancing and
18 These were: Estonia; Lithuania; Latvia; Czech Republic; Slovakia; Hungary; Slovenia; Poland;
Croatia.
19 These were: Bulgaria; Moldova; Albania; Russia; Ukraine; Romania; Belarus; Macedonia; Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
20 Pejovich 2008 does not present any tests for the statistical significance of the differences between the
means but the present writer has verified that the differences are statistically significant.
21 La Porta et al. 1997, 1998.
22 This sometimes referred to as ‘legal origin theory’.
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thus promote economic growth. To some extent the reform strategies have also
incorporated attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory
and court systems. Whilst it is a matter of logic that even the best laws will have no
effect if they are not enforced by the courts the relative importance of content and
enforcement has been relatively neglected. An analysis by the present writer and
Stefan Van Hemmen23 using similar data as LLSV (1998) supplemented by other
data on the financial sector and allowing their measure of enforcement to interact
with their measures of legal content found results which suggest:
• the greater the size of the financial sector the greater is economic growth;
• both major components of the financial sector (size of stock market, amount of
bank lending) are affected both by the content of laws and the effectiveness of
enforcement; but
• in the case of stock market capitalisation the interaction of the legal content
measures and the enforcement measures suggests that for:
• countries where the level of enforcement is poor24 only improvement in
enforcement of the law is what matters;
• countries where enforcement is at reasonable level25 improvement in both
enforcement and the content of shareholder protection laws is desirable; and
• countries where enforcement is already high26 only improvement in the
content of the laws matters.
These studies suggest that while the content of laws is an important factor in
determining economic development, improvement in the judicial system is also
important and in some cases more important.
4.3 The transplant effect
In parallel to, and to an extent in response to, the development of legal origin theory
a literature examining empirically the impact of legal transplants has also
developed.27 There is also a literature in comparative law where there has been a
debate between those who argue that legal transplants are not possible and those
who argue that not only are they possible but that all legal systems incorporate
transplants. This paper is not the place to engage in the wider conceptual debate and
will focus on the empirical evidence of the impact of legal transplants generally and
the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe in particular.
23 Stephen and Hemman 2004. This statistical analysis is extended further in the present writer’s
forthcoming monograph (fn. 1 supra).
24 Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Zimbabwe and possibly Colombia.
25 Indonesia, Egypt, Argentina, India, Turkey, Mexico, Israel, Brazil, Greece, Chile, Thailand, Korea,
Malaysia and Spain.
26 Portugal, Singapore, Italy, Taiwan, France, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany,
USA, Finland, New Zealand, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria and Norway.
27 See in particular Berkowitz et al. 2003, Pistor et al. 2000, 2003.
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Katherina Pistor and a number of collaborators have combined knowledge of
laws across jurisdictions with economic analysis and econometric estimation
techniques to analyse what factors have been key in the success of legal transplants.
They conclude that the process of transplanting is more important than the content
of the code being transplanted. It is this that determines the effectiveness of
enforcement (which they call ‘legality’). To be effective law must be meaningful in
the context of application. Legal actors must increase the quality of law in response
to a demand for legality. Legal cultures already exist where transplants take place.
Sometimes the legal culture may be based on informal norms and rules as well as
formal rules. These authors make the point that effectiveness requires rules to be
interpreted and understood. When transplants take place gaps in understanding and
interpretation may arise and transplants need to be adapted to the local context of
the recipient jurisdiction. ‘Receptivity’ is the term used here to indicate the
willingness to give meaning to imported law. It will be greater the more the
transplanted law is adapted to local conditions and the more familiar legal agents are
with the legal order from which the transplant comes.
Legal transplants may occur for a number of reasons: conquest; colonial
settlement; conditionality; emulation. Perhaps the majority of legal transplants have
taken place through conquest e.g. Roman Law throughout Europe during the period
of the Roman Empire until the Napoleonic code was spread through continental
Europe as well as French and Spanish colonies in the nineteenth century. A
distinction is made between conquest and colonial settlement to reflect the
difference between French and Spanish colonies which were essentially extractive
in nature and the British colonies to which settlers took the common law e.g. North
America, Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa. Conditionality refers to the case
where a legal transplant takes place as a condition for some other activity e.g.
accession to the European Union. Emulation refers to transplants which result from
the receiving jurisdiction wishing to import laws which they believe to be desirable
for them to adopt. e.g. for the purpose of comprehensively modernising the
economy as an act of sovereignty.
The authors cited in fn. 27 argue that the success of a transplant is not merely
dependent on the reason for it taking place. They argue that what is important is
adaptability and familiarity. Is the transplant adaptable to local conditions? Are
local legal actors familiar with what is being transplanted? Familiarity can come
from frequent contact with the legal system of origin which will be enhanced if the
receiving jurisdiction’s legal order has similarities to that of the transplant’s origin.
In order to make their hypothesis empirically testable the authors devise the
concepts of receptive and unreceptive transplants. Their hypothesis is that legality
(their measure of enforcement) will be greater for receptive than for unreceptive
transplant. They further hypothesise that the higher the level of legality the greater
will be the impact of the legal system on income per capita in the jurisdiction. There
is an obvious link with the research of Stephen and Van Hemmen discussed above.
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (supra fn. 27) examine data for 24 transition countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Confederation of
Independent States. Here the focus is on stock market capitalisation and creditor
rights (as in Stephen and Van Hemmen, supra) i.e. the financial sector and the
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influence of shareholder and creditor protection laws. The authors judge the laws on
the books covering these issues in some countries to be of a high standard. Of
particular interest is their finding of a strong correlation between receptive
transplants and various measures of enforcement. Overall their results support the
view that enforcement is more important than the content of investor and creditor
laws (which appear to have little effect) in promoting stock market capitalisation
and bank lending.
Berkowitz et al. (2003, supra fn.27) use data from 39 countries who were
historically recipients of legal transplants to test for the effects of legal origin and
legality on income per capita as well the influence of legal origin and transplant
receptivity on legality. Thus legal origin has a direct effect and an indirect effect on
income per capita, the indirect effect being through legality but legality is also
affected by whether the transplant from the legal origin is judged to be a receptive or
unreceptive transplant. Their statistical results suggest that the direct effect of legal
origin on income per capita is higher for French and German legal origins than other
legal origins and that the higher is their measure of legality the higher is income per
capita. However, the indirect effect of legal origin on income per capita (through
legality) is such that French legal origin has a negative effect and unreceptive legal
transplants have a negative effect. The indirect negative effect of French Civil Law
origin is such that it cancels out the positive direct effect. For present purposes the
important result is that legality (which we have called enforcement earlier) is lower
for unreceptive transplants than for receptive ones and as a consequence income per
capita will be lower, inter alia. These results suggest that there must be a demand
for a transplant (as well as a supply) for it to be effective. They also add weight to
the view that enforcement is probably more important than the content of the law.
4.4 Summary of evidence
What insights can be gained from the evidence examined in this section? It is more
than suggestive that the content of laws designed to support the market do not have
the decisive effect. Enforcement is of major importance. Laws which clash with
local culture will be resisted and circumvented by various means. Where laws are
transplanted from foreign legal cultures a demand must exist for them to be
implemented successfully. This implementation is likely to be more successful the
more familiar local legal actors are with the legal order from which the transplants
come.
5 Summary and conclusions
This paper has considered issues relevant to the design of a legal regime to support
the Chinese authority’s objective of moving towards the New Normal Economy. It
has used the conceptual framework of NIE to argue that the legal system as an
element of the institutional environment constrains governance and the play of the
market economy but is itself constrained by culture. As well as conceptual argument
this approach has been supported by reviewing empirical evidence on the influence
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of culture on the economic transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
the importance of enforcement of laws (as opposed to their content) governing
investor and creditor protection on economic development and the significance of
receptivity in determining the effect of transplanted laws.
The implications of this analysis for legal policymakers in China is that when
considering reform of laws governing market activity attention should be paid to the
legal order from which any legal transplants come to improve their receptivity as
well as their fit with Chinese culture. Furthermore a high priority should be given to
reform of the judicial system in ways that will make the law more predictable and
effective.
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